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Abstract
There is much evidence to suggest that having more education leads to posi-
tive labour market returns in the form of higher earnings. However, there is little
causal evidence about whether education reduces earnings uncertainty and volatil-
ity or helps to shelter workers from the adverse effects of recessions. We use a large
British administrative panel data set to study the impact of the 1972 change in
compulsory schooling on earnings volatility of the employed. Our regression dis-
continuity estimates suggest that men whose education was increased by the law
subsequently had lower earnings variability, less pro-cyclical earnings, and were less
likely to experience real pay cuts. However, there is little evidence that educa-
tion affects earnings variability for older men. Our results provide another avenue
through which education may lead to an increase in welfare.
∗Thanks to the UK data service for kindly allowing access to the data. Delaney gratefully acknowl-
edges financial support from the ESRC which was received while undertaking part of this research. We
also thank Eric French for helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
Earnings volatility is a feature of modern labour markets as individual workers are subject
to wage and hours variation. In the absence of full insurance against labour market
adversities, volatility can have large effects on the welfare of individuals (Low et al. (2010),
Heathcote et al. (2014), French (2005), Banks et al. (2001), Blundell et al. (2008)).
Can investments in education provide shelter against these economic uncertainties? We
study how compulsory schooling laws that increase educational attainment affect several
measures of earnings volatility faced by employees.
We focus on three different measures of earnings volatility – earnings variability (the
individual-level standard deviation of earnings within 5-year periods), the degree of earn-
ings cyclicality, and the probability of experiencing a pay cut. Together these capture
many aspects of volatility but not all. For example, they don’t capture variation over time
in the average earnings across 5-year periods. Note, also, that our focus is on variation
over time in earnings for individual workers and we do not study how the cross-sectional
variance of earnings differs by education level.
Persons with more education may have higher ability and differ in other unobserv-
able ways that lead them to have less or more earnings volatility independent of their
educational attainment. Generally, the empirical work in this area has documented as-
sociations between educational attainment and earnings volatility rather than sought to
estimate causal effects.1 There are some exceptions: Although not the central focus of
her paper, Chen (2008) uses U.S. data to estimate the effect of education on the transi-
tory component of earnings using a parametric selection model. Contemporaneous to our
research, Liu et al. (2015) use compulsory schooling changes in Norway to estimate how
education affects the transitory component of earnings. Our focus is different in that we
study simple direct measures of earnings volatility experienced by employed individuals.
1Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) using the PSID find a u-shaped pattern with high school graduates
having lower earnings volatility than high school dropouts but higher than college graduates, while
Blundell et al. (2015) using Norwegian data find that the interaction of earnings volatility and the
life cycle differs by education. There is also a substantial theoretical literature that directly models
the inherent risk in education, for example, Altonji (1993), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Johnson (2013),
Athreya and Eberly (2013), and Ionescu and Simpson (2015).
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In fact, to our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the direct causal effect of
education on these particular measures. Additionally, we contribute to the literature by
studying a highly cyclical labour market up to and including the great recession.
Our analysis uses a regression discontinuity design based on a change in compulsory
schooling combined with a large panel dataset. We find that an additional year of edu-
cation leads to a reduced standard deviation of log earnings of about 0.01 (around 10%
of the mean standard deviation), decreased probability of receiving a pay cut of about
3.5 percentage points and to a lower level of earnings cyclicality. However, there is little
evidence that education affects earnings variability for older men. A recent survey paper
highlights that education leads to large benefits in terms of wages, health, employment,
voting behaviour, crime, teenage pregnancy, decision making and in many other dimen-
sions (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011); we show an additional channel through which
education may lead to welfare gains for individuals – lower earnings volatility.
There are many reasons to expect that earnings volatility may be influenced by ed-
ucation level. When searching for jobs, more educated workers may be more effective
(have greater search capital) and may achieve better job matches with lower subsequent
earnings volatility (Mincer, 1991). More educated workers are likely to be more mobile
geographically and hence able to move region in order to reduce the effects of local shocks
(Machin et al. 2012). Finally, more educated workers may be quicker to adapt to techno-
logical advances and/or have skills which are complementary to technology, and so may
have less variable earnings in times of structural change within the economy. While these
factors tend to imply lower earnings volatility for more educated workers, there are other
factors that suggest the opposite. More education typically comes with the likelihood of
greater specialisation that may make the worker more exposed to specific shocks. The
presence of the minimum wage may also lead to less volatility for those with lower ed-
ucation since it provides a lower bound on wages. As such, whether greater education
lowers earnings volatility of employed workers is an empirical question which we attempt
to answer in this paper.
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2 Data
The New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) is a large administrative dataset cov-
ering the period 1975 to 2013. It follows a random sample of 1% of the British population
whose national insurance number ends in a certain pair of digits. The survey refers to a
specific week in April each year and excludes the self employed. Because the survey uses
national insurance numbers, the attrition rate is very low since if an individual temporar-
ily drops out of the labour market, becomes unemployed, self-employed or changes job,
they will tend to be picked up again once they begin working. The main advantage of the
dataset, apart from the large sample sizes, is that the data are very accurate. Employers
are obliged by law to fill out the employee information and thus there is less measure-
ment error or non-response than is typically the case in household surveys.2 Also, the
long period of time covered by the dataset makes it ideal for estimating cyclical effects.
The data span the recessions of the early 80s, early 90s and the recent ‘Great Recession’.
If an individual is not in the data in a particular year, we do not observe whether
this is due to non-employment, self-employment, or to some form of non-response. Up
to 2003, men who changed jobs between February and April are likely to be missing as
the survey forms were sent out to employers in February but employers are asked about
their employees in a specific week in April. Additionally, persons who terminate or begin
jobs during the reference week in April are missed. On average, during their time in the
NESPD, about 33% of observations are missing in any particular year. Consistent with
most of the returns to education literature, our analysis is conditional on employment as
there is no way to credibly impute earnings for persons who are missing from the survey.
Later, we show that there is no evidence that the probability of being missing from the
survey is related to the education reform. Additionally, when studying the standard
deviation of weekly earnings we show that our estimates are robust to requiring differing
numbers of non-missing observations in each of the 5-year periods we study.
Our measure of earnings is the log of weekly pay including overtime. Because of
2One concern is that since the survey is based on payroll records it only samples those who earn enough
to be above the PAYE threshold; however Devereux and Hart (2010) have shown that the exclusion of
those who earn very low earnings is not important.
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the difficult issues involved with dealing with non-participation of women in the labour
market, we focus our analysis on males. We exclude those individuals whose pay was
affected by absence and limit the sample to employed men aged between 20 and 60 to
reduce selection effects that typically occur at the beginning and end of the life cycle.3
Because the compulsory schooling law changed for the 1957 cohort, we only include those
born between 1947 and 1967 and, in our primary analysis, we study cohorts born between
1952 and 1962.
For survey years prior to 2004, the age variable in the survey refers to age as at
January 1st. Therefore, we calculate year of birth as year - age - 1. From 2004 onwards
the age variable refers to age as at the time of survey which implies that assigning year of
birth to be equal to year - age - 1 will only be correct roughly two thirds of the time. We
contacted the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) who kindly provided us with the
actual year of birth of individuals from 2004 onwards. Since the first persons affected by
the law change were born in September 1957, this implies that our 1957 cohort includes
both treated and untreated individuals. Therefore, we drop this cohort in our main
analyses but also report estimates where we set the law variable equal to 1/3 for persons
born in 1957. We do know, however, that all persons in our 1956 cohort were untreated
and all persons in our 1958 cohort were treated.4
Persons born in 1962 are recorded as aged 20 in the 1983 survey year. 1983 is,
therefore, the first survey year in which all persons born between 1952 and 1962 are
potentially in our sample. Likewise, persons born in 1952 are aged 60 in 2013 so this
is the last year in which all persons born between 1952 and 1962 are potentially in our
sample. For this reason, we restrict our analysis to the 1983 to 2013 years of the NESPD.
If we were to use earlier survey years, some cohorts would not be present in all years and
our estimates could be affected by year effects arising from periods of very high or low
earnings volatility.
3Since we are interested in the effect of an extra year of school at age 15, by age 20 we expect that
the complier group will mostly be in the labour market.
4We have information on school cohort from 2004 but not for earlier survey years. Because most of
our data are pre-2004, we use calendar year cohort in our analysis. This affects the efficiency of our
estimates but not consistency. Estimates using school cohort as the running variable for the post-2004
observations are similar to those using calendar year.
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We deflate the weekly pay measure to 2013 prices using the Retail Price Index (RPI)
for April and trim the bottom and top 0.5% of earnings each year to eliminate serious
outliers.5 In addition, we drop observations with sex or age discrepancies. Finally, we
drop those with hours of work less than 1 hour per week. The resulting sample has
1,104,104 observations. The unemployment rate we use refers to the claimant count rate
for the April corresponding to the survey year. When conducting regional analysis we
use the corresponding regional unemployment rate.
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for our broad sample that includes cohorts
from 1947 to 1967 and our primary sample that includes just the 1952-62 birth cohorts.
The ”Law Affected” variable is 1 if the person was subject to the higher compulsory
schooling age of 16 and zero otherwise.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Males NESPD 1983-2013
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Cohorts = 1947-1967
Year 1,104,104 1997.23 8.48
Cohort 1,104,104 1957.37 6.08
Age 1,104,104 38.95 9.57
Log Weekly Pay 1,104,104 6.33 0.514
Law Affected 1,104,104 0.536 0.499
Cohorts = 1952-1962
Year 574,498 1997.15 8.76
Cohort 574,498 1957.25 3.33
Age 574,498 38.99 9.35
Log Weekly Pay 574,498 6.34 0.512
Law Affected 574,498 0.537 0.499
Note: Observations refers to number of person-year observations
5The RPI is the only price index in the UK which covers the sample period.
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3 Earnings Volatility Measures
In this section, we discuss the rationale for each measure and how exactly we implement
it in our data. We can only consider earnings of employed men as we have no information
on earnings for the non-employed or self-employed.
Standard Deviation of Earnings: We use the standard deviation of log(weekly pay)
as our primary measure of earnings uncertainty faced by men. Since education may have
differing effects on earnings variability at different ages, we construct the standard de-
viation for each person at each age using the variation in log(weekly pay) over the five
year period centred on that age. To help describe our basic approach, we start with the
simple statistical model:
yit = Xitβt + it (1)
Here yit is log(weekly pay) and X is a full set of cohort and year indicators. As
these subsume age indicators, X controls for predictable life-cycle effects on earnings as
well as aggregate shocks that differ across years. The error term, , then reflects that
part of earnings that is not systematically related to cohort, age, or year. We take a
particular year and then keep all observations in the 5 year window centred on it. So,
for example, for 1985, we keep observations from 1983 to 1987. We then estimate the
regression above on these data and estimate the standard deviation of the residual for each
individual separately. That is, for each individual, we calculate the standard deviation
of their earnings residual over this 5-year period. This gives us a measure of earnings
volatility for that person in that year.6 This procedure gives us one observation for each
individual for the middle year of each 5-year period and allows us to estimate the effect of
education on earnings volatility at each age. We use the terms uncertainty and volatility
interchangeably, however, we acknowledge that part of our measure of earnings volatility
may not actually represent true uncertainty if individuals know in advance the variation
6An alternative to this approach would be to estimate the parameters of an earnings process and use
it to estimate the variances of transitory and permanent components. Our approach has the advantage
of not relying on the specification of some arbitrary parametric form for the income process.
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in earnings they face.7
In practice, for various reasons, it is not the case that every person is in our sample
in every year of each rolling 5-year panel. Therefore, we face a trade-off in that, if we
require people to have valid wage observations in all 5 years, we will have a much reduced
sample size and a quite selected sample. However, if we estimate the standard deviation
in all feasible cases (i.e. where there are at least 2 observations on the individual), some
standard deviations will be much more precisely estimated than others. In practice, we
have taken a compromise position of requiring a valid wage observation for at least 4
years out of the 5 although we show later that the results are robust to restricting the
sample to those with at least 2, 3, or 5 observations.8
Earnings Cyclicality: The extent to which earnings move in line with the business
cycle is another important measure of earnings volatility. There is a large literature that
studies the relationship between education and the degree of wage cyclicality but none
of these papers attempt to estimate the causal effect of education.9 The papers usually
estimate regressions with a wage variable as the dependent variable and some business
cycle proxy such as the unemployment rate as a right hand side regressor and either look
7 There has been a series of papers in the literature attempting to address this issue – separating
what is known in advance from what is actual uncertainty using, for example, information on education
choices (Cunha et al. (2005)) and consumption (Blundell et al. (2008)). We do not have data on either
of these variables and therefore we do not attempt to identify how much of the variability is known in
advance. As a result, we interpret our volatility measure as representing an upper bound on the amount
of uncertainty faced by an individual.
8We have examined whether the law affects the probability of having a wage observation in our sample
for at least 4 of the 5 years and found no evidence of any relationship (See Section 6 below). So, it is
unlikely that selection bias is a problem when we require presence in 4 out of 5 years.
9The literature looking at the effects of wage cyclicality across education groups finds mixed results.
On the one hand, Solon et al. (1994), Stockman (1983), Bils (1985) and Keane and Prasad (1991) find
no difference in wage cyclicality across education groups. However, Freeman (1991), Bartik (1991), Hines
et al. (2001) and Hoynes et al. (2012) find strong evidence that the low educated are most sensitive
to business cycles while Ammermueller et al. (2009) find the opposite. Recently, Blundell et al. (2014)
show that between 2009 and 2012 real wages decreased by about 10 percent for all education groups in
the UK.
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separately by education group or interact the unemployment rate with education. How-
ever, this may represent only correlations and obscure the fact that those with different
levels of education may differ in other unobservable ways that affect wage cyclicality.
Our first measure of the business cycle is the UK unemployment rate in April of the
survey year (the NESPD survey takes place in April). The basic idea is to first estimate
the earnings cyclicality coefficient for each cohort and then to treat the earnings cyclicality
of the cohort as the dependent variable in the second cohort-level step. We obtain the
cyclical coefficients for each cohort by estimating the following regression for each cohort
separately.
∆yit = α0 + α1c∆ut + α2year + it
Here ∆y denotes the change in log earnings and ∆u denotes the change in the aggre-
gate unemployment rate while controlling for year allows for a linear trend in earnings
growth.10 We use the estimated coefficient from each cohort-specific regression α1c, as
our measure of the earnings cyclicality experienced by cohort c.
In order to allow for more variation in unemployment rates we add to our aggregate
analysis by also exploiting variation in regional unemployment rates. We use the 12
standard statistical regions used for the UK. The empirical analysis follows exactly as
before except we add region dummies in the first step and use the regional unemployment
rate rather than the national unemployment rate. Here r denotes region.
∆yitr = α0 + α1c∆utr + α2year + regionr + itr
Figure 1 shows the unemployment rates in each region over the sample period. While
the unemployment rates typically tend to move in unison, there is some divergence in
unemployment rates between regions.11 Once again, we use the estimated coefficient from
10By taking the difference in log earnings we increase the robustness of our estimates by getting rid
of unobserved heterogeneity that is fixed over time. This specification is fairly standard in the wage
cyclicality literature and is used, for example, by Solon et al. (1994)
11 We have also looked at estimates whereby we add year dummies to the first step to allow us to
control for year effects so that we are only left with the variation in unemployment rates that is derived
uniquely from variation across regions and abstracts from any national business cycles. However, due to
the fact that the regional rates are so highly correlated, the standard errors become very large and the
estimates are not informative.
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each cohort-specific regression α1c, as our measure of the earnings cyclicality experienced
by cohort c.
Figure 1: Regional Unemployment Rates
Pay Cuts: We use the prevalence of pay cuts as an additional measure of earnings
volatility. Earnings generally rise over the life-cycle so pay cuts are likely to be unexpected
and unpleasant for workers. Nickell et al. (2002) use occupation coding to assign workers
to skill groups and find that low skilled workers are more likely to experience nominal
pay cuts. But, again, we are unaware of analysis in the literature of the causal effects of
education on the probability of a pay cut. These issues have become particularly relevant
in the recent great recession where there has been a large surge in both real and nominal
pay cuts. In keeping with our analysis of standard deviations, we measure pay cuts as
occurring if the weekly pay of a worker is lower than he received 5 years previously. We
define a pay cut to be equal to 1 if the current weekly pay is less than weekly pay at
period t-4, i.e. if at the end of the 5-year period, weekly pay is less than it was at the
beginning of the period. By studying cuts over a 5-year period, we reduce the number of
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cuts that occur due to extremely short-term changes and so should have less noise in our
measure. We focus our analysis only on real pay cuts.
4 Estimation Strategy
In 1972 the UK government raised the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16. This
law affected all students in England, Wales and Scotland born on or after September
1st 1957 and was a follow up to the first raising of the school leaving age (RoSLA) in
1947.12 These laws have been much utilised in the literature to estimate the returns to
additional years of education (Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006), Grenet
(2013), Devereux and Hart (2010), Clark and Royer (2013), Buscha and Dickson (2015),
Dolton and Sandi (2017)). We use a regression discontinuity design which provides very
robust estimates since we only focus on changes in outcomes of those born on either side
of the cut-off.
Our primary approach is to estimate the model non-parametrically using a local linear
regression with rectangular kernel weights (Hahn et al. (2001)).13 To focus on cohorts
born close to the law change, we restrict the sample to cohorts born between 1952 and
1962 corresponding to 5 years on either side. However, we also show estimates where
we use bigger bandwidths (cohorts born up to 10 years each side of the discontinuity)
and other specifications such as a global polynomial approach, similar to Devereux and
Hart (2010) and Oreopoulos (2006). One important issue with regression discontinuity
designs is determining the best way to conduct inference. With cohort-based designs like
ours, researchers often choose to cluster by cohort. However, this has been shown to be
very unreliable if the number of clusters is small such as in our case where we have 10
12The relevant statutory instruments can be found at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1972/59/pdfs/uksi 19720059 en.pdf for Scotland and
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1972/444/pdfs/uksi 19720444 en.pdf for England and Wales.
See, also, Barcellos et al. (2017) for details. Our sample includes men who reside in Scotland as well as
in England and Wales.
13Imbens and Lemieux (2008) suggest using a simple rectangular kernel since using different weights
only changes those estimates which are already sensitive to the bandwidth and thus are already invalid.
Moreover the asymptotic bias is independent of the choice of weights.
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cohorts in the local linear regressions. To avoid this issue we conduct all our analysis at
the cohort level. First, we average each dependent variable by cohort and then we run
the regressions at the level of the cohort means. As suggested by Dickens (1990) and
Donald and Lang (2007), we do not weight by the number of observations in each cohort
(weighted estimates are very similar).14
The NESPD dataset contains very accurate earnings data, has large sample sizes, and
has repeated observations on individuals that allow us to construct individual measures
of earnings volatility. However, it does not contain data on month of birth. Given persons
born after September 1st 1957 were subject to the new compulsory schooling law, we use
a ‘donut’ style approach whereby we omit the year 1957 from the estimation.
We focus on the reduced form relationship between the law and our outcome variables:
Yit = θ0 + θ1Lawi + f(Y OBi) + uit (2)
Here Y refers to the dependent variable of interest and Law is an indicator variable de-
noting whether the individual was born before or after 1957. The function f(.) represents
a smooth function of year of birth. When we use local linear regression this is a linear
function of year of birth that is allowed to have different slopes on each side of the dis-
continuity. In other specifications f(.) is proxied by a low order polynomial. We estimate
this regression by survey year, so cohort is perfectly collinear with age. The YOB control
allows for linear cohort/age effects and the effect of the law is identified by the presence
of a discontinuity after the law change.
Note that we do not control for labour market experience. People who stay in school
longer will tend to have less labour market experience at any age but, in keeping with
most of the causal literature, we treat this as part of the causal effect of obtaining more
schooling.
Our dataset does not have information on years of education. Given that the UK
compulsory schooling laws have been so widely studied, we follow Buscha and Dickson
(2015) and use 0.30 as our estimate of the first stage. This is due to the general consensus
in the literature that the law increased years of schooling by about 0.3 for males. Therefore
the results that we find using the NESPD can be multiplied by about 3.33 to provide
14This approach is conservative as it implies that our main regressions have only 10 observations.
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the effect of an extra year of education on the outcome variable. As a robustness check
we also calculated the first stage using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and
found a first stage effect of 0.332 with a standard error equal to 0.061 (see figure A1
in the Appendix for a visual representation). This is very similar to previous studies.
The figure below shows the first stage effect of the compulsory schooling change on the
proportion leaving school at age 15 using the BHPS.15
The large first stage effect implies that the law change affected a sizeable proportion
of the population. Other evidence also suggests that affected men were fairly ”typical”
in terms of earnings. Men in our cohorts who left school at age 16, have median earnings
that are at the 44th percentile of the overall male wage distribution and about 40% have
above median earnings (authors’ calculations using the Quarterly Labour Force Survey).
5 Results
5.1 Log Weekly Pay
While our interest is in earnings volatility rather than in the level of earnings, we provide
some context by first showing the effects of the reform on log weekly pay. Recent research
(Bhuller et al. (2013), Buscha and Dickson (2015)) has emphasised the importance of
variation in the return to education over the lifecycle. Table 2 reports estimates by year
15In the appendix, we show a similar figure but with age left school on the y-axis.
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and thus tracks out returns over the life-cycle. For example, the first estimate is for
1983 when the 1957 cohort is aged 25 (and the 52-62 cohorts used in estimation are aged
between 20 and 30). The final estimate is for 2013 at which point the 1957 cohort is
aged 55 and the cohorts used in estimation are aged between 50 and 60. The estimates
suggest returns to reform exposure of about 4% at around age 35 and returns of about
2% at younger ages. Evidence for positive returns is weak for men over age 40 and the
coefficient is even negative in a few of the later years.16
In Table 2 we also show results where we pool across ages. First, we take average
log(weekly pay) across all years for each cohort and then use it as the dependent variable.
The resultant coefficient of 0.018 is not statistically significant but implies a return to an
extra year of education of about 6%. This is similar to what other researchers have found
for this law change using other data sets (Grenet (2013), Dickson (2012)).17 We also split
the sample in two into a younger group (when the 1957 cohort is aged 25 to 39) and an
older group (when the 1957 cohort is aged 40 to 55) and report separate estimates for
these two groups. Consistent with the life-cycle patterns, the point estimate is somewhat
larger for the younger group. Figures 2 - 4 provide a visual impression of these estimates
by plotting out average log(weekly pay) by cohort. Note that there is a clear pattern of
earnings falling with cohort for younger men. This presumably arises because they are
on the upward sloping part of their life-cycle earnings profile.
It is important to note that while our sample gets older as we move to later survey
years, we cannot be sure that differences in estimates by age are true effects of ageing.
16While many studies have shown life-cycle relationships between education and earnings, we are only
aware of two studies that show causal estimates by detailed age. Using a very different estimation
method Buscha and Dickson (2015) show a broadly similar pattern of increasing then decreasing returns
using the NESPD. Our estimates are, however, in contrast to results from Norway which show that the
returns are typically lower at the beginning of the life cycle and higher at the end (Bhuller et al. 2013).
However, the authors note in their paper that these types of estimates are likely to vary across national
and institutional settings.
17Grenet (2013) uses the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from 1993 to 2004 and finds a return of 6-7%
while Dickson (2012) using the British Household Panel Survey 1991 to 2006 finds a 10% return. While
our estimate is lower than these, we show later that our estimates are slightly higher when we use a
bigger bandwidth.
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This is because the return to education could change across time even if the average age
of sample members was time invariant. One possible reason is secular changes in the
return to education that might arise because of technological change. Another is cyclical
effects that could arise if education influences how earnings respond to the business cycle.
We examine this directly later in the paper.
Table 2: Effect of the Law on Log Weekly Pay
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1983 (25) 0.0187 (0.0173) 1999 (41) 0.0068 (0.0167)
1984 (26) 0.0271 (0.0178) 2000 (42) 0.0244 (0.0252)
1985 (27) 0.0218 (0.0205) 2001 (43) 0.0163 (0.0200)
1986 (28) 0.0286 (0.0167) 2002 (44) 0.0006 (0.0196)
1987 (29) 0.0260 (0.0211) 2003 (45) 0.0168 (0.0203)
1988 (30) 0.0109 (0.0226) 2004 (46) 0.0050 (0.0226)
1989 (31) 0.0289 (0.0166) 2005 (47) 0.0226 (0.0254)
1990 (32) 0.0300 (0.0178) 2006 (48) 0.0230 (0.0233)
1991 (33) 0.0356* (0.0179) 2007 (49) 0.0372 (0.0218)
1992 (34) 0.0466*** (0.0111) 2008 (50) 0.0246 (0.0276)
1993 (35) 0.0462* (0.0198) 2009 (51) 0.0324 (0.0187)
1994 (36) 0.0424** (0.0144) 2010 (52) -0.0142 (0.0131)
1995 (37) 0.0276* (0.0136) 2011 (53) 0.0103 (0.0176)
1996 (38) 0.0212 (0.0166) 2012 (54) 0.0053 (0.0112)
1997 (39) 0.0175 (0.0096) 2013 (55) -0.0114 (0.0206)
1998 (40) -0.0032 (0.0179)
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0252* (0.0122) n = 302,527 Y¯ = 6.24
Older (aged 40+) 0.0141 (0.0154) n = 271,971 Y¯ = 6.45
All 0.0180 (0.0118) n = 574,498 Y¯ = 6.34
All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at
.01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean of the dependent variable.
5.2 Standard Deviation of Earnings
Table 3 shows the effects of the law on the standard deviation of earnings over the life
cycle. Because, we can only estimate this for the middle year in each rolling 5-year period,
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we have estimates by year from 1985 to 2011. What is immediately clear from the table
is that most of the effect of education on earnings volatility happens at young ages with
more education leading to less volatility. There are large effects of education around age
27-32 in the range of about 0.01. The average standard deviation for the 1957 cohort
in this age range is 0.15. Therefore, a coefficient of -0.01 implies about a 7% reduction.
Given an effect of the law change on education of about 0.3, this implies that an extra
year of education decreases earnings volatility by around 0.03 or by about 20% of the
mean which is quite a large effect. However, the size of the effects gets smaller as men age
and many of the point estimates even become positive (albeit statistically insignificant)
as men approach their 50s. One interpretation of this pattern is that more education
helps people to find better and more stable job matches in their early career but the
effect becomes unimportant at older ages when most individuals have found suitable job
matches. Of course, as mentioned earlier, an alternative possibility is that these are
time rather than age effects and that education particularly sheltered workers during the
1985-1990 period. While we can’t rule out this possibility, the general pattern seems
more consistent with an age rather than a cyclical effect.
As in Table 2, we also report estimates where we increase precision by pooling across
age groups. We find a statistically significant effect of -0.0065 for men aged less than 40
but no evidence of any effect for older men. We can assess whether these estimates are
statistically different using a Hausman test as under the null that there is no difference
between young and old, using the full sample is a consistent and efficient estimator for the
young (or old) while, under the alternative hypothesis, it is inconsistent for each individual
group. Using this test, we find that the young and old estimates are statistically different
at the 10% level. Over the entire life cycle, the average effect is -0.0042 but this estimate
is not statistically significant.
Figures 5 - 7 provide a visual impression of these estimates. While the discontinuity
is obvious for younger men, there is no obvious jump for the 1957 cohort in the older
sample. Note that there is a clear pattern of earnings uncertainty rising with cohort for
younger men. This arises because earnings uncertainty falls with age as workers become
more settled into the labour market and the variability of earnings changes declines.
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Table 3: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Log Earnings
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0110*** (0.0029) 1999 (41) -0.0057 (0.0050)
1986 (28) -0.0118 (0.0066) 2000 (42) -0.0069*** (0.0019)
1987 (29) -0.0081 (0.0056) 2001 (43) -0.0044 (0.0057)
1988 (30) -0.0111*** (0.0024) 2002 (44) -0.0045 (0.0050)
1989 (31) -0.0101*** (0.0025) 2003 (45) -0.0001 (0.0057)
1990 (32) -0.0067 (0.0055) 2004 (46) 0.0033 (0.0059)
1991 (33) -0.0050 (0.0034) 2005 (47) 0.0009 (0.0070)
1992 (34) -0.0014 (0.0057) 2006 (48) -0.0037 (0.0053 )
1993 (35) -0.0042 (0.0062) 2007 (49) -0.0088 (0.0060)
1994 (36) -0.0049 (0.0040) 2008 (50) -0.0015 (0.0039)
1995 (37) -0.0047 (0.0047) 2009 (51) -0.0008 (0.0066)
1996 (38) -0.0060 (0.0034) 2010 (52) 0.0033 (0.0073)
1997 (39) -0.0045 (0.0034) 2011 (53) 0.0064 (0.0048)
1998 (40) -0.0062 (0.0044)
Young (aged less than 40) -0.0065** (0.0026) n = 197,741 Y¯ = 0.142
Older (aged 40+) -0.0022 (0.0027) n = 175,943 Y¯ = 0.122
All -0.0042 (0.0025) n = 373,684 Y¯ = 0.132
Standard deviations measured in the 5-year period centred around the listed year with at least 4
observations per window. Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and
1962 with the 1957 cohort omitted. All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean of
the dependent variable.
In the estimates so far, we require at least 4 wage observations per person in each
5-year window. In Table 4, we examine whether the estimates are sensitive to using
different requirements. First, looking at the sample sizes, we see that as we move from
the least restrictive (only requiring 2 observations) to the most restrictive (requiring all
5), we lose over half the person-year observations. However, the estimates are quite robust
– the effect of the law on the younger group varies between -0.0063 and -0.0071 and is
always statistically significant. Likewise, there is never any evidence of an effect on the
older group.
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Table 4: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Earnings
Effect Sample Size Sample Mean
SD calculated using at least 2 obs
Young -0.0064** (0.0026) 255,679 0.1467
Old -0.0018 (0.0028) 235,281 0.1266
All -0.0041 (0.0025) 490,960 0.1371
SD calculated using at least 3 obs
Young -0.0063** (0.0026) 238,787 0.1446
Old -0.0021 (0.0024) 218,468 0.1245
All -0.0040 (0.0024) 457,255 0.1350
SD calculated using at least 4 obs
Young -0.0065** (0.0026) 197,741 0.1416
Old -0.0022 (0.0027) 175,943 0.1221
All -0.0042 (0.0025) 373,684 0.1325
SD calculated using at least 5 obs
Young -0.0071* (0.0031) 126,388 0.1343
Old 0.0010 (0.0024) 111,500 0.1144
All -0.0031 (0.0026) 237,888 0.1250
All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard deviations measured in the 5-year period centred
around the listed year. Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962
with the 1957 cohort omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at
.05 and * at .10.
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Figure 2: Log Weekly Pay, Young Figure 3: Log Weekly Pay, Old
Figure 4: Log Weekly Pay, All Figure 5: Standard Deviation, Young
Figure 6: Standard Deviation, Old Figure 7: Standard Deviation, All
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5.3 Earnings Cyclicality
As mentioned earlier, we calculate an earnings cyclicality coefficient for each cohort. To
estimate the effect of the law on earnings cyclicality, we do a cohort-level regression
where we regress the cyclicality coefficient for each cohort on the law using the local
linear specification. The estimates are reported in Table 5.
Because we need a large time dimension to reliably estimate the earnings cyclicality
coefficients, we cannot study how the effect of the law on earnings cyclicality varies at
each individual age. We report estimates for the full set of years (1983-2013) and also
split the sample by age group (younger versus older) as before. In practice, we estimate
earnings cyclicality over the 1983-1997 period when studying the younger group and the
1998-2013 period for the older group. However, the standard errors are very high for the
older group so this estimate is not very informative. In Table 5 we see that the effect of
the law on earnings cyclicality is about 0.0039 overall and similarly, about 0.0044 for the
younger group. Both these estimates are very statistically significant.
Table 5: Effect of the Law on Earnings Cyclicality
Sample Effect Sample Size Sample Mean
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0044*** (0.0008) 223,974 -0.0037
Older (40+) 0.0005 (0.0054) 202,412 0.0123
All 0.0039*** (0.0008) 441,890 -0.0012
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort
omitted. All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level:
*** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10.
To get a sense of the magnitudes, it is helpful to look at figures 8 - 10. The pictures
show the estimated earnings cyclicality coefficient by cohort. For young men, this is
always negative, reflecting the fact that earnings are mildly procyclical with estimates
ranging from close to zero to -0.007. These suggest that a one point increase in the
unemployment rate reduces earnings by between 0 and 0.7% and indicate considerably
larger cyclical sensitivity for later cohorts. For the full sample, the divergence across
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cohort is smaller at between about 0 to -0.003. The greater procyclicality experienced by
those born in the early- to mid-1960s may result from the fact that they were relatively
young during the turbulent decade of the 1980s and younger workers are more sensitive to
cyclical shocks.18 However, it is difficult to establish a precise reason for the cohort trends
using our data. There is clear jump for the 1958 cohort with the levels of cyclicality being
lower (in absolute terms) after the law change than before.
5.3.1 Regional shocks
Table 6: Effect of the Law on Regional Earnings Cyclicality
Sample Effect Sample Size Sample Mean
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0038*** (0.0007) 223,974 -0.0039
Older (40+) 0.0010 (0.0052) 202,412 0.0107
All 0.0034** (0.0010) 441,890 -0.0013
The cyclical indicator is the contemporaneous regional unemployment rate for April. All regressions
done at the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and
* at .10.
Table 6 shows the regional cyclicality estimates. The results are similar to the estimates
using the national unemployment rate both in terms of the coefficient estimates and
standard errors. This is not surprising since Figure 1 highlights that unemployment rates
tend to move in parallel across regions. However, it is reassuring that, once we look
within region and so control for any regional effects, the negative effect of the law change
on earnings cyclicality remains.
18Much research has found that younger people are more sensitive to the business cycle, for example,
Hoynes et al. (2012) and Elsby et al. (2010).
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Figure 8: Cyclicality, Young Figure 9: Cyclicality, Old
Figure 10: Cyclicality, All Figure 11: Regional Cyclicality, Young
Figure 12: Regional Cyclicality, Old Figure 13: Regional Cyclicality, All
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5.4 Pay cuts
Table 7 shows the effect of the law on the probability of a real pay cut in each 5-year
period centred on the reported year. We define the pay cut variable to be equal to 1 if the
real weekly pay at the end of the 5-year period is less than what it was at the beginning
of the period. So, for example, for the year 1987 in Table 7, the estimate shows the
effect of the law change on the probability that the real weekly pay in 1989 is lower than
that in 1985. There is no clear pattern in the results with education leading to a lower
probability of receiving a cut in some years, for example, in 1989, 1992 and 2004 but at
other times leading to an increased likelihood of a pay cut. The effect of education on
lowering the probability of receiving a pay cut in 1992 is consistent with the fact that
the 1990’s recession had large adverse effects on those with the least education. It is
not clear why the effects in 2004 are so large but it is something that we think deserves
further investigation. The increased probability of the higher educated receiving a pay
cut between 2007 and 2011 (as shown by the 2009 estimate) is consistent with evidence
that the Great Recession had a bigger impact on those with more education, in particular
bankers and those working in the financial industry.19
Overall the effect of the law is to reduce the probability of a pay cut by 1.09 percentage
points. The average probability of a pay cut for the 1957 cohort over the sample period
is 0.342. Therefore, a coefficient of -0.0109 implies about a 3.2% reduction. This implies
that an extra year of education reduces the probability of receiving a pay cut by about
10.6 percent. However, it is important to keep in mind that there is a lot of heterogeneity
across years with positive coefficients in some years and negative ones in others so the
average effects over the entire period should be treated with caution.
19This is not surprising given that in 2009 financial institutions reacted to the Lehman Brothers’
collapse by cutting pay.
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Table 7: Effect of the Law on the Probability of a Real Weekly Pay Cut (over 5-Year
Period)
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0150 (0.0109) 1999 (41) -0.0210 (0.0121)
1986 (28) -0.0260 (0.0133) 2000 (42) -0.0236 (0.0218)
1987 (29) 0.0001 (0.0169) 2001 (43) 0.0010 (0.0195)
1988 (30) -0.0122 (0.0103) 2002 (44) 0.0087 (0.0150)
1989 (31) -0.0195* (0.0096) 2003 (45) -0.0176 (0.0288)
1990 (32) -0.0288 (0.0216) 2004 (46) -0.0616*** (0.0162)
1991 (33) 0.0001 (0.0158) 2005 (47) -0.0111 (0.0202)
1992 (34) -0.0299* (0.0143) 2006 (48) -0.0451 (0.0330)
1993 (35) -0.0049 (0.0152) 2007 (49) -0.0071 (0.0176)
1994 (36) 0.0171* (0.0076) 2008 (50) -0.0000 (0.0155)
1995 (37) 0.0381* (0.0181) 2009 (51) 0.0447* (0.0191)
1996 (38) 0.0259 (0.0221) 2010 (52) 0.0279 (0.0207)
1997 (39) -0.0118 (0.0100) 2011 (53) 0.0180 (0.0149)
1998 (40) -0.0074 (0.0164)
Young (aged less than 40) -0.0081* (0.0037) n = 157,710 Y¯ = 0.260
Older (aged 40+) -0.0093 (0.0065) n = 195,484 Y¯ = 0.407
All -0.0109* (0.0046) n = 353,194 Y¯ = 0.342
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort
omitted. All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level:
*** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean of the dependent variable.
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Figure 14: Probability of Pay Cut, Young
Figure 15: Probability of Pay Cut, Old
Figure 16: Probability of Pay Cut, All
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6 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform some robustness checks for each of our outcome measures. The
estimates are reported in the Appendix.
6.1 Bandwidth and Model Specification
First, we look at the effects of changing the bandwidth and the model specification. To
compare with our baseline estimates that do local linear regression using a bandwidth of 5,
we examine the effect of bandwidths of 7 and 10 using a range of different specifications.
Since the fit can vary greatly between specifications, we use the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) to pick the model that fits best in each case. With the bandwidth of
5, the standard errors get very high when we use high order polynomials. Therefore,
for this bandwidth, we only report a global quadratic in addition to the local linear
specification. For bandwidths 7 and 10, we report local quadratic estimates that allow a
different quadratic function each side of the discontinuity and also global quadratic, cubic,
and quartic specifications. In each case, the estimate favoured by the AIC criterion is
reported in bold.
The estimates are in Tables A1 to A5. In general, we find that, once one chooses
the specification with the best fit for each bandwidth, the estimates are quite robust to
specification. One finding is that the effect of the law on log(earnings) is stronger with
the bandwidth of 10 – here we find statistically significant estimates of about 3% for the
young and 2% for the older men. On average the effect of the law is about 2% which
implies a return to education of about 7%. The estimates for the standard deviation, for
earnings cyclicality, and (to a lesser extent) for pay cuts are all similar across bandwidths.
We conclude that our findings are quite robust to the choice of bandwidth or specification.
Because persons born in 1957 may or may not have been subject to the new law, we
have used a “donut” approach that involved excluding the 1957 cohort from the analysis.
In Table A6 we take an alternative approach of setting the law variable equal to 1/3
for the 1957 cohort. This reflects the fact that men born in September and after were
affected and they constitute approximately 1/3 of the cohort. We find that the estimates
are quite similar using this specification. One exception is that the effect of the law on
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taking a real pay cut is no longer statistically significant. The lack of robustness of this
result is perhaps unsurprising given the large variability in the estimates that we found
for this variable across years.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, we have missing observations for each of the depen-
dent variables because of non-employment, self-employment, and non-response. Here, we
investigate whether the law can predict whether there is missing data on the dependent
variables. We use the same local linear specification as for our main estimates. As can
be seen in Table A7, we find that there is no evidence for any systematic relationship
between the law and whether the dependent variables are missing. This finding is con-
sistent with our earlier result that the estimates for the standard deviation are robust
to variation in the number of required observations for each person over the five-year
period. While this evidence cannot be definitive, it suggests that our estimates may not
be biased by selection issues.
6.2 Looking Beyond Weekly Earnings
Our measure of weekly earnings depends both on average hourly earnings and weekly
hours worked. Conveniently, the log of weekly earnings equals the sum of the logs of
each of these two variables and we look at the effect of the law change on each of these
in turn. Note that weekly hours are reported by employers and reflect contracted hours
including overtime hours. As shown in Table A8, we find very little evidence that hours
variation is an important part of the story – exposure to the law has little effect on hours
or our measures of hours variability. Indeed, the findings for the log hourly wage are
fairly similar to those for weekly earnings, suggesting that the law mainly impacts weekly
earnings through its effects on average hourly earnings.
From 1996, the NES has reported a measure of annual earnings with the current
employer that encapsulates the 12-month period ending at the survey date in April. We
use this variable for our “older” sample for the 1998-2013 period. We would expect the
estimates to differ from those for weekly earnings if there is significant variation in hours
worked over the year. In Table A9, we show estimates with this earnings measure along
with estimates for weekly earnings for the exact same sample of men. The estimates are
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generally very similar and reinforce our earlier finding that the law appears to have little
effect on the earnings variability of older men.
6.3 Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual Level
We have conducted all our analysis at the cohort level. An alternative approach to
inference is not to group by cohort but to instead treat deviation from the local linear
or polynomial fit as specification error and report robust standard errors (Chamberlain,
1994). In situations where we pool years and so have repeated observations on individuals,
we implement this method by clustering by individual. As a check on our earlier estimates,
we report these standard errors in Tables A10 to A12. Given that earnings cyclicality
is measured at the cohort level, it is not possible to generate standard errors at the
individual level for this outcome. We find that the level of statistical significance is
generally similar with this approach compared to our earlier approach. All our findings
are robust to using this alternative method of inference.
7 Conclusion
We look at the effects of education on earnings volatility via the effects on earnings vari-
ability, earnings cyclicality, and frequency of real pay cuts of employed men. Across all
three mechanisms, the results point towards benefits from education through sheltering
men from the adverse effects of earnings shocks. We find that more education leads to
lower earnings variability at younger ages but with no discernible benefits for persons
aged over 40. We also find that more educated men are less affected by wage cyclicality.
Our findings for real wage cuts are quite heterogeneous with the effects varying in magni-
tude and sign across different years. On average, however, more educated workers appear
less likely to experience real wage cuts. The estimates are robust across many specifi-
cations. Overall, our paper identifies another, and largely unexplored, avenue through
which education leads to positive rewards in the labour market.
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Appendix
First Stage Effect of the 1972 Schooling Reform
Figure A1: First stage effect using BHPS
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Varying Bandwidth and Specification
Table A1: Effect of the Law on Log Weekly Pay
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0252* (0.0122) 0.0144 (0.0154) 0.0180 (0.0118)
Global Quadratic 0.0252* (0.0111) 0.0141 (0.0147) 0.0180 (0.0118)
Sample Size 302,527 271,971 574,498
Sample Mean 6.237 6.450 6.338
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0012 (0.0142) 0.0215* (0.0111) 0.0040 (0.0116)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0458* (0.0215) -0.0007 (0.0208) 0.0269 (0.0203)
Global Quadratic 0.0012 (0.0150) 0.0215* (0.0114) 0.0040 (0.0120)
Global Cubic 0.0369* (0.0183) 0.0079 (0.0173) 0.0239 (0.0172)
Global Quartic 0.0369** (0.0157) 0.0079 (0.0173) 0.0239 (0.0152)
Sample Size 417,611 377,869 795,480
Sample Mean 6.235 6.449 6.337
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0197 (0.0121) 0.0227** (0.0096) -0.0127 (0.0098)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0321** (0.0138) 0.0116 (0.0156) 0.0231 (0.0134)
Global Quadratic -0.0185 (0.0127) 0.0225** (0.0089) -0.0127 (0.0103)
Global Cubic 0.0193 (0.0135) 0.0138 (0.0129) 0.0148 (0.0121)
Global Quartic 0.0198 (0.013) 0.0149 (0.0132) 0.0144 (0.0123)
Sample Size 578,171 525,933 1,104,104
Sample Mean 6.238 6.442 6.335
Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike
Information Criterion. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10.
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Table A2: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Weekly Pay
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0065** (0.0027) -0.0021 (0.0028) -0.0042 (0.0026)
Global Quadratic -0.0065** (0.0027) -0.0021 (0.0029) -0.0042 (0.0026)
Sample Size 197,741 175,943 373,684
Sample Mean 0.1416 0.1221 0.1325
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0036 (0.0026) -0.0024 (0.0022) -0.0024 (0.0022)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0085* (0.0041) -0.0018 (0.0044) -0.0056 (0.0040)
Global Quadratic -0.0036 (0.0025) -0.0024 (0.0021) -0.0024 (0.0021)
Global Cubic -0.0072* (0.0036) -0.0016 (0.0034) -0.0046 (0.0032)
Global Quartic -0.0072** (0.0031) -0.0016 (0.0035) -0.0046 (0.0032)
Sample Size 273,186 244,299 517,485
Sample Mean 0.1423 0.1229 0.1331
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0001 (0.0023) -0.0017 (0.0023) 0.0005 (0.0021)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0074** (0.0033) -0.0015 (0.0042) -0.0048 (0.0035)
Global Quadratic -0.0001 (0.0022) -0.0017 (0.0023) 0.0005 (0.0021)
Global Cubic -0.0053* (0.0028) -0.0011 (0.0035) -0.0031 (0.0029)
Global Quartic -0.0053* (0.0029) -0.0012 (0.0036) -0.0031 (0.0030)
Sample Size 378,017 337,411 715,428
Sample Mean 0.1419 0.1240 0.1335
Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike
Information Criterion. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10.
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Table A3: Effect of the Law on Weekly Pay Cyclicality
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0044*** (0.0008) 0.0005 (0.0054) 0.0039*** (0.0008)
Global Quadratic 0.0044*** (0.0008) 0.0005 (0.0058) 0.0039*** (0.0009)
Sample Size 223,974 202,412 441,890
Sample Mean -0.0037 0.0123 -0.0012
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0033*** (0.0008) 0.0041 (0.0053) 0.0032*** (0.0006)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0046** (0.0014) -0.0004 (0.0080) 0.0045*** (0.0010)
Global Quadratic 0.0033*** (0.0008) 0.0041 (0.0050) 0.0032*** (0.0006)
Global Cubic 0.0044*** (0.0010) 0.0012 (0.0080) 0.0042*** (0.0009)
Global Quartic 0.0044*** (0.0011) 0.0013 (0.0080) 0.0042*** (0.001)
Sample Size 308,167 280,359 610,332
Sample Mean -0.0041 0.0137 -0.0014
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0005 (0.0013) 0.0047 (0.0055) 0.0006 (0.0012)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0062*** (0.0013) -0.0018 (0.0094) 0.0060*** (0.0011)
Global Quadratic 0.0005 (0.0013) 0.0047 (0.0054) 0.0006 (0.0012)
Global Cubic 0.0050*** (0.0012) -0.0011 (0.0079) 0.0048*** (0.0011)
Global Quartic 0.0050*** (0.0008) -0.0011 (0.0079) 0.0048*** (0.0008)
Sample Size 425,838 387,590 844,682
Sample Mean -0.0041 0.0139 -0.0015
The contemporaneous national rate of unemployment for April is used as the cyclical indicator.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike
Information Criterion. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10.
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Table A4: Effect of the Law on Regional Weekly Pay Cyclicality
Young Old All
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0038*** (0.0007) 0.0010 (0.0052) 0.0034** (0.0010)
Global Quadratic 0.0038*** (0.0008) 0.0010 (0.0054) 0.0034** (0.0010)
Sample Size 223,974 202,412 441,890
Sample Mean -0.0039 0.0107 -0.0013
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0030*** (0.0006) 0.0038 (0.0047) 0.003*** (0.0007)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0040*** (0.0012) -0.0004 0.0077 0.0039** (0.0012)
Global Quadratic 0.0030*** (0.0006) 0.0038 (0.0044) 0.0030*** (0.0007)
Global Cubic 0.0039*** (0.0009) 0.0011 (0.0070) 0.0036*** (0.0011)
Global Quartic 0.0039*** (0.001) 0.0012 (0.0072) 0.0036** (0.0011)
Sample Size 308,167 280,359 610,332
Sample Mean -0.0042 0.0120 -0.0014
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) 0.0004 (0.0012) 0.0025 (0.0042) 0.0006 (0.0011)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) 0.0057*** (0.0012) 0.0005 (0.0076) 0.0054*** (0.0012)
Global Quadratic 0.0004 (0.0012) 0.0025 (0.0041) 0.0006 (0.0011)
Global Cubic 0.0046*** (0.0011) 0.0005 (0.0062) 0.0044*** (0.0011)
Global Quartic 0.0046*** (0.0008) 0.0005 (0.0064) 0.0044*** (0.0009)
Sample Size 425,838 387,590 844,682
Sample Mean -0.0043 0.0119 -0.0016
The contemporaneous regional rate of unemployment for April is used as the cyclical indicator.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike
Information Criterion. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10.
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Table A5: Effect of the Law on Probability of Real Weekly Pay Cut over 5-Year Period
Young Old All
Bandwidth = 5
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0081* (0.0037) -0.0093 (0.0065) -0.0109* (0.0046)
Global Quadratic -0.0081** (0.0025) -0.0093 (0.0065) -0.0109** (0.0044)
Sample Size 157,710 195,484 353,194
Sample Mean 0.2601 0.4068 0.3413
Bandwidth = 7
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0135* (0.0065) -0.0201** (0.0080) -0.0219*** (0.0059)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0079 (0.0120) 0.0064 (0.0097) 0.0008 (0.0077)
Global Quadratic -0.0135* (0.0069) -0.0201** (0.0073) -0.0219*** (0.0061)
Global Cubic -0.0103 (0.0110) -0.0001 (0.0077) -0.0053 (0.0066)
Global Quartic -0.0103 (0.0091) -0.0001 (0.0079) -0.0053 (0.0061)
Sample Size 215,787 270,848 486,635
Sample Mean 0.2600 0.4014 0.3387
Bandwidth = 10
Linear (Different Slopes) -0.0097* (0.0052) -0.0193* (0.0068) -0.0225*** (0.0042)
Quadratic (Different Slopes) -0.0148 (0.0087) -0.0151 (0.0113) -0.0155* (0.0073)
Global Quadratic -0.0097* (0.0054) -0.0193*** (0.0063) -0.0225*** (0.0046)
Global Cubic -0.042* (0.0079) -0.0181* (0.0094) -0.0187** (0.0067)
Global Quartic -0.0142* (0.0079) -0.0181* (0.0092) -0.0187*** (0.0062)
Sample Size 294,567 374,496 669,063
Sample Mean 0.2632 0.3922 0.3354
Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures in bold denote the preferred model according to the Akaike
Information Criterion. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10.
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No Donut
Table A6: Effect of Assigning 1/3 of 1957 cohort to be Affected by Law
Sample Baseline (Donut) n No Donut n
Log Weekly Pay
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0252* (0.0122) 302,527 0.0256* (0.0111) 331,471
Older (40+) 0.0141 (0.0154) 271,971 0.0144 (0.0140) 298,100
All 0.0180 (0.0118) 574,498 0.0180 (0.0107) 629,,571
Standard Deviation
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0065** (0.0026) 197,741 -0.0059* (0.0027) 216,602
Older (40+) -0.0022 (0.0027) 175,943 -0.0012 (0.0030) 193,040
All -0.0042 (0.0025) 373,684 -0.0034 (0.0028) 409,642
Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0044*** (0.0008) 223,974 0.0040*** (0.0010) 245,377
Older (40+) 0.0005 (0.0054) 202,412 0.0009 (0.0050) 221,990
All 0.0039*** (0.0008) 441,890 0.0036*** (0.0009) 484,306
Regional Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0038*** (0.0007) 223,974 0.0036*** (0.0008) 245,377
Older (40+) 0.0010 (0.0052) 202,412 0.0013 (0.0048) 221,990
All 0.0034** (0.0010) 441,890 0.0032** (0.0010) 484,306
Real Pay Cut
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0081* (0.0037) 157,710 -0.0043 (0.0080) 172,776
Older (40+) -0.0093 (0.0065) 195,484 -0.0084 (0.0061) 214,421
All -0.0109* (0.0046) 353,194 -0.0089 (0.0056) 387,197
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962. All regressions done at
the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10.
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Selection Bias
Table A7: Probability Dependent Variable is Missing
Sample Effect n Y¯
Log Weekly Pay
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0073 (0.0111) 455,178 0.3354
Older (40+) 0.0010 (0.0057) 389,403 0.3016
All -0.0038 (0.0079) 844,581 0.3198
Standard Deviation
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0188 (0.0136) 398,095 0.4680
Older (40+) 0.0055 (0.0079) 356,769 0.4750
All -0.0073 (0.0090) 754,864 0.4713
Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0106 (0.0092) 455,178 0.5079
Older (40+) 0.0018 (0.0061) 389,403 0.4404
All -0.0048 (0.0071) 844,581 0.4768
Regional Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0106 (0.0092) 455,178 0.5079
Older (40+) 0.0018 (0.0061) 389,403 0.4404
All -0.0048 (0.0071) 844,581 0.4768
Real Pay Cut
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0192 (0.0114) 337,332 0.5325
Older (40+) 0.0021 (0.0066) 398,403 0.4980
All -0.0076 (0.0074) 726,735 0.5140
Because the cyclicality analysis is done at the cohort level, the missingness indicator here is an indicator for whether the
change in log weekly earnings is missing. Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962
with the 1957 cohort omitted. All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance
level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean of the dependent variable.
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Log Hours and Log Hourly Wage
Table A8: Effect of the Law on Log Hours and Log Hourly Wage
Sample Log Hours Y¯ Log Hourly Wage Y¯ n
Log Weekly Pay
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0005 (0.0038) 3.707 0.028** (0.0110) 2.5310 281,601
Older (40+) -0.0050 (0.0058) 3.662 0.0182 (0.0151) 2.7890 269,979
All -0.0023 (0.0045) 3.685 0.0207 (0.0112) 2.6570 551,580
Standard Deviation
Young (aged 27 to 39) -0.0005 (0.0014) 0.0730 -0.0042** (0.0016) 0.1077 175,873
Older (40+) -0.0008 (0.0011) 0.0709 -0.0016 (0.0025) 0.0986 173,441
All -0.0007 (0.0010) 0.0719 -0.0027 (0.0019) 0.1032 349,314
Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0018 (0.0010) -0.0030 0.0037*** (0.0006) -0.0008 202,084
Older (40+) 0.0043 (0.0039) -0.0066 -0.0046 (0.0026) 0.0190 200,448
All 0.0025* (0.0016) -0.0032 0.0022** (0.0008) 0.0020 417,559
Regional Earnings Cyclicality
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0014 (0.0011) -0.0030 0.0036*** (0.0004) -0.0010 202,084
Older (40+) 0.0042 (0.0032) -0.0062 -0.0036 (0.0026) 0.0170 200,448
All 0.0023* (0.0011) -0.0031 0.0020* (0.0009) 0.0020 417,559
Real Pay Cut
Young (aged 27 to 39) 0.0054 (0.0035) 0.3735 -0.0107 (0.0060) 0.2194 139,763
Older (40+) -0.0061 (0.0054) 0.4366 -0.0163* (0.0082) 0.3818 191,046
All -0.0022 (0.0038) 0.4100 -0.0162** (0.0065) 0.3132 330,809
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort
omitted. All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level:
*** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean of the dependent variable.
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Annual Gross Pay
Table A9: Effect of Law using Annual Gross Pay
Sample Weekly Gross Pay Y¯ Annual Gross Pay Y¯ n
Log Pay
Older (40+) 0.0137 (0.0147) 6.452 0.0140 (0.0132) 10.356 269,089
Standard Deviation
Older (40+) -0.0019 (0.0032) 0.1202 0.0039 (0.0044) 0.1478 173,051
Earnings Cyclicality
Older (40+) -0.0003 (0.0041) -0.0111 -0.0008 (0.0109) 0.0044 229,365
Regional Earnings Cyclicality
Older (40+) -0.0002 (0.0091) 0.0189 -0.0034 (0.0053) -0.0073 229,365
Real Pay Cut
Older (40+) -0.0120 (0.0065) 0.4226 -0.0088 (0.0095) 0.3999 163,167
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort
omitted. All regressions done at the cohort level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level:
*** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean of the dependent variable.
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Effect of Using Robust Standard Errors
Table A10: Effect of the Law on Log Weekly Pay
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1983 (25) 0.0179 (0.0110) 1999 (41) 0.0070 (0.0170)
1984 (26) 0.0266** (0.0116) 2000 (42) 0.0251 (0.0173)
1985 (27) 0.0213* (0.0121) 2001 (43) 0.0165 (0.0180)
1986 (28) 0.0285** (0.0123) 2002 (44) 0.0010 (0.0183)
1987 (29) 0.0261** (0.013) 2003 (45) 0.0172 (0.0182)
1988 (30) 0.0106 (0.0133) 2004 (46) 0.0054 (0.0187)
1989 (31) 0.0292** (0.0136) 2005 (47) 0.0226 (0.0191)
1990 (32) 0.0301** (0.0137) 2006 (48) 0.0239 (0.0194)
1991 (33) 0.0354** (0.0139) 2007 (49) 0.0375* (0.0225)
1992 (34) 0.0468*** (0.0146) 2008 (50) 0.0255 (0.0229)
1993 (35) 0.0457*** (0.0152) 2009 (51) 0.0317 (0.0207)
1994 (36) 0.0426*** (0.0153) 2010 (52) -0.0143 (0.0213)
1995 (37) 0.0275* (0.0162) 2011 (53) 0.0104 (0.0216)
1996 (38) 0.0213 (0.0166) 2012 (54) 0.0052 (0.0228)
1997 (39) 0.0176 (0.0169) 2013 (55) -0.0089 (0.0240)
1998 (40) -0.0029 (0.0168)
Young (aged less than 40) 0.0252*** (0.0095) n=302,527 Y¯ = 6.237
Older (aged 40+) 0.0143 (0.0141) n=271,971 Y¯ = 6.450
All 0.0181* (0.0105) n=574,498 Y¯ = 6.338
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Significance level: *** at
.01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean.
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Table A11: Effect of the Law on the Standard Deviation of Log Weekly Pay
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0111*** (0.0042) 1999 (41) -0.0055 (0.0045)
1986 (28) -0.0118*** (0.0043) 2000 (42) -0.0068** (0.0047)
1987 (29) -0.0081* (0.0042) 2001 (43) -0.0042 (0.0047)
1988 (30) -0.0111** (0.0043) 2002 (44) -0.0043 (0.0047)
1989 (31) -0.0102** (0.0042) 2003 (45) 0.0001 (0.0048)
1990 (32) -0.0068 (0.0042) 2004 (46) 0.0034 (0.0047)
1991 (33) -0.0050 (0.0043) 2005 (47) 0.0010 (0.0050)
1992 (34) -0.0015 (0.0043) 2006 (48) -0.0036 (0.0054)
1993 (35) -0.0042 (0.0046) 2007 (49) -0.0088 (0.0056)
1994 (36) -0.0050 (0.0046) 2008 (50) -0.0016 (0.0058)
1995 (37) -0.0047 (0.0046) 2009 (51) -0.0009 (0.0057)
1996 (38) -0.0059 (0.0046) 2010 (52) 0.0032 (0.0052)
1997 (39) -0.0044 (0.0046) 2011 (53) 0.0060 (0.0054)
1998 (40) -0.0060 (0.0046)
Young (aged less than 40) -.0065** (0.0026) n = 197,741 Y¯ = 0.1416
Older (aged 40+) -0.0021 (0.0028) n = 175,943 Y¯ = 0.1221
All -0.0042** (0.0021) n = 373,684 Y¯ = 0.1325
Standard deviations measured in the 5-year period centred around the listed year with at least 4
observations per window. Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and
1962 with the 1957 cohort omitted. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in
parenthesis. Significance level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean.
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Table A12: Effect of the Law on the Probability of a Real Weekly Pay Cut (over 5-Year
Period)
Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect Year (age of 1957 cohort) Effect
1985 (27) -0.0154 (0.0157) 1999 (41) -0.0207 (0.0190)
1986 (28) -0.0253* (0.0150) 2000 (42) -0.0250 (0.0181)
1987 (29) -0.0001 (0.0155) 2001 (43) 0.0014 (0.0188)
1988 (30) -0.0123 (0.0165) 2002 (44) 0.0088 (0.0192)
1989 (31) -0.0196* (0.0171) 2003 (45) -0.0164 (0.0199)
1990 (32) -0.0291 (0.0177) 2004 (46) -0.0623*** (0.0202)
1991 (33) -0.0001 (0.0179) 2005 (47) -0.0117 (0.0228)
1992 (34) -0.0300* (0.0176) 2006 (48) -0.0450* (0.0235)
1993 (35) -0.0047 (0.0178) 2007 (49) -0.0074 (0.0208)
1994 (36) 0.0172 (0.0180) 2008 (50) -0.0004 (0.0214)
1995 (37) 0.0380** (0.0186) 2009 (51) 0.0430* (0.0229)
1996 (38) 0.0256 (0.0184) 2010 (52) 0.0275 (0.0230)
1997 (39) -0.0116 (0.0182) 2011 (53) 0.0167 (0.0190)
1998 (40) -0.0073 (0.0186)
Young (aged less than 40) -0.0082 (0.0066) n = 157,710 Y¯ = 0.2601
Older (aged 40+) -0.0094 (0.0067) n = 195,484 Y¯ = 0.4068
All -0.0110** (0.0051) n = 353,194 Y¯ = 0.3413
Local linear regression estimates using cohorts born between 1952 and 1962 with the 1957 cohort
omitted. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Significance
level: *** at .01, ** at .05 and * at .10. Y¯ refers to the sample mean.
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